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THE IMPACT OF MINORITY SET-ASIDE 

PROGRAMS ON BLACK BUSINESS SUCCESS 

IN CLEVELAND, OHIO: IMPLICATIONS 

FOR PUBLIC POLICY 

DR. BESSIE HOUSE-SOREMEKUN* 
INTRODUCfrON 
Over the past few decades, African American entrepreneur­
ship has become an increasingly important focus for scholars, politi­
cians, public policy analysts, and economic development 
practitioners, in terms of developing concrete strategies to assist en­
trepreneurs to achieve economic success. This increasing interest in 
minority entrepreneurship has been influenced by the tremendous 
growth that has taken place in the African American-owned busi­
ness sector. According to the 2002 census data, there are approxi­
mately 1.2 million Black-owned businesses in the United States, 
which represents an increase of forty-five percent since 1997.1 
One strategy that developed in the political arena as a tool to 
enhance the survival of small, disadvantaged business enterprises, 
many of which were owned and operated by African American en­
trepreneurs, was the establishment of minority set-aside programs. 
This Essay will examine the interrelationship between politics and 
economics by studying the impact of minority set-aside programs 
(also known as disadvantaged business programs) on the economic 
outcomes of African American entrepreneurs. This study is partic­
ularly important because of challenges in recent decades that have 
emerged, both nationally and locally, against affirmative action pol­
* Dr. Bessie House-Soremekun is the Public Scholar in African American Stud­
ies, Civic Engagement, and Entrepreneurship at Indiana University-Purdue University 
in Indianapolis. She is a professor of political science and African American and Afri­
can diaspora studies. She is also the President, founder, and CEO of the National 
Center for Entrepreneurship, Inc. and is an entrepreneur herself, having established 
several for-profit and nonprofit business organizations. The author would like to thank 
the Ohio Board of Regents for funding the research project on which this Essay is 
based. 
1. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Revenues for Black-Owned Firms Near 
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icies, and by extension, minority set-aside programs. This study will 
provide a historical and legal context to the current debate over the 
survival of minority set-aside programs and will analyze their em­
pirical impacts on Black business owners in Cleveland, Ohio. 




The genesis for the development of minority set-aside pro­
grams can be traced back to the 1930s when President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt first developed his New Deal programs to ad­
dress economic problems that developed during the Great Depres­
sion.2 Roosevelt's Unemployment Relief Act of 1933 forbade 
discrimination against individuals because of their "race, color, or 
creed."3 Other New Deal programs, enacted by President 
Roosevelt, also utilized this same language.4 Harold L. Ickes, the 
Secretary of the Interior, also ensured that, at least in theory, dis­
crimination in Public Works Administration projects would also be 
forbidden.5 Requirements were set forth mandating that businesses 
receiving federal contracts in cities with large Black populations 
must hire a percentage of Black workers.6 In spite of all of these 
provisions, many employers and trade unions simply refused to 
abide by the regulations.? 
In June of 1942, A. Phillip Randolph and his associates lobbied 
on behalf of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.S Others 
joined in to call for the end of Jim Crow segregation in the U.S. 
Armed Services units and in various defense plants across the coun­
try.9 In response, President Roosevelt issued an executive order 
that outlawed discrimination of workers in government or defense 
industries on the basis of their national origin, color, race, or 
creed.lO As Terry Anderson noted: 
2. See Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Con­
stitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1739 (2007). 
3. Unemployment Relief Act, ch. 17, § 1, 48 Stat. 22, 23 (1933) (repealed 1966). 
4. Terry H. Anderson, The Strange Career of Affirmative Action, S. CENT. REv., 
Summer 2005, at 110, 110. 
5. !d. 
6. Id. 
7. !d. at 110-11. 
8. Id. at 111-12. 
9. !d. 
10. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943); Anderson, supra note 4, at 
111-12. 
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[D]uring the Great Depression and two wars, race relations be­
gan to change in America. Many began to think that all taxpay­
ers should have the opportunity to jobs supported by their taxes, 
in civilian or military life, and that concept was the foundation 
for a policy that eventually became known as affirmative 
action.11 
The civil rights movement, which began in Montgomery, Ala­
bama, in 1955, drew national and international attention to the 
plight of African Americans in the United States,12 "Numerous 
events of the civil rights era, the language it embodied, the politics 
of its broader implications, Rosa Parks becoming the Mother of the 
modern civil rights movement, rhetoric, and the information that 
gave meaning to the struggle served as symbols for the possibilities 
yet to come."13 President John F. Kennedy was responsible for put­
ting forth Executive Order 10,925, which mandated that govern­
ment contractors utilize affirmative action to ensure that applicants 
were provided employment and were treated fairly during their em­
ployment periods without regard to their color, creed, race, or na­
tional origin.14 This was the very first time that the government 
used the term "affirmative action."15 
There was a great deal of resistance to these executive orders 
by various sectors of the American population. It was during the 
administration of President Lyndon Johnson that the Civil Rights 
Act of 196416 and the Voting Rights Act of 196517 were passed. The 
Civil Rights Act empowered the Attorney General's Office to en­
sure that the basic provisions outlined in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution were being adequately enforced. 
Ironically, even though a Civil Rights Act had been passed in 1866, 
it had not been adequately enforced; which is why the 1964 law was 
11. Anderson, supra note 4, at 112. 
12. Bessie House-Soremekun, Lessons from Down Under: Reflections on Mean­
ings of Literacy and Knowledge from an African-American Female Growing Up in Rural 
Alabama, in READERS OF THE QUILT: ESSAYS ON BEING BLACK, FEMALE, AND LITER­
ATE 57, 58-59 (Joanne Kilgour Dowdy ed., 2005). 
13. Id. 
14. Exec. Order No. 10,925,3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963), superseded by Exec. Order 
No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (2000). 
15. Id.; THOMAS D. BOSTON, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BLACK ENTREPRE. 
NEURSHIP 84 (1999); Anderson, supra note 4, at 114. 
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e). 
17. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.). 
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necessary.18 In particular, Titles II and III of the 1964 law19 gave 
the Attorney General's Office the power needed to enforce the de­
segregation provisions mandated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education.20 This case successfully decimated the premise 
behind the "separate but equal" arguments in America.21 Thus, 
from this point on, African Americans would be able to attend edu­
cational institutions that had previously been denied to them be­
cause of their race.22 
Executive Order 11,246, which was put forth by President 
Johnson and subsequently implemented in 1965, provided more 
equality in the area of employment discrimination.23 This Order, 
and its subsequent amendments, mandated that any entity that re­
ceived federal dollars for contracts in excess of fifty thousand dol­
lars had to develop written affirmative action plans and utilize 
principles of affirmative action in its recruitment and hiring prac­
tices.24 All of these programs helped to provide a climate condu­
cive to the development of programs to assist African American 
entrepreneurs.25 
When the Small Business Administration (SBA) was estab­
lished in 1953, its initial focus was not on minority businesses per 
se.26 Instead, its primary interest was on small businesses in the 
United States, most of which were owned by White entrepreneurs 
at that timeY The SBA continued to grow and it became a perma­
nent federal agency in 1958.28 During this time period, one of the 
main areas of focus for the Administration was on providing eco­
nomic assistance in the form of loans to small businesses, as well as 
assisting them in receiving federal contract dollars.29 
18. Civil Rights Act of 1868, 42 U.S.c. § 1981. 
19. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201-307. 
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
21. Id. at 495. 
22. See BESSIE HOUSE-SOREMEKUN, CONFRONTING THE ODDS: AFRICAN AMERI­
CAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 46 (2002). See generally LUCIUS J. 
BARKER & MACK H. JONES, AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 107-08 (3d ed. 1994). 
23. See Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 386 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended 
in 42 U.s.c. § 2000e. 
24. Id.; BOSTON, supra note 15, at 85. 
25. See BOSTON, supra note 15, at 85. 
26. Small Bus. Admin., About SBA, http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/index.html (last 
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President Richard Nixon introduced Executive Order 11,458 in 
March of 1969, which provided the foundation for the establish­
ment of a national program to help minority-owned businesses.3o 
The Secretary of Commerce was charged with monitoring this pro­
gram in order to develop processes at the federal, state, and local 
levels to assist in the long-term development of minority firms.31 
Thus, several leaders of federal departments had to provide reports 
to the Secretary of Commerce to explain their plans to achieve pos­
itive outcomes.32 The end result was the establishment of the Of­
fice of Minority Business Enterprise.33 
The Small Business Act created the famous 8(a) program in 
1969, which provided for the use of federal contracts to companies 
owned by "economically disadvantaged individuals."34 While it is 
true that this law was not specifically designed for African Ameri­
cans at this time, as Timothy Bates has so eloquently argued, "the 
language of 'socially or economically disadvantaged' entrepreneurs 
being eligible for 8(a) program assistance, however, opened the 
door to participation by minority entrepreneurs, whose incomes ac­
tually exceeded those associated with a poverty level of 
existence. "35 
Billions of dollars have been awarded to minority entrepre­
neurs over the years.36 The passage of the Public Works Employ­
ment Act of 1977,37 as well as the Omnibus Small Business Act of 
1978,38 helped to establish realistic goals with regard to procure­
ment dollars and contracts for minority businesses. This legislation 
mandated that about ten percent of all federal contracts awarded 
for local public works projects had to be given to minority business 
enterprises.39 
30. Exec. Order No. 11,458,3 C.F.R. 779 (1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 15 
U.S.C. § 631 (2000). 
31. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 11. 
32. See id. 
33. Id. 
34. Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations, 
13 C.F.R. § 124.101 (2007); see Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, § 8(a), 
67 Stat. 232 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 637). 
35. Timothy Bates, The Impact of Preferential Procurement Policies on Minority­
Owned Businesses, 14 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 51, 53 (1985). 
36. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 11. 
37. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28,91 Stat. 116 (codi­
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6708, 6710). 
38. Small Business Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-633, 636, 637, 644). 
39. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 11, 33. 
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A. The State and Local Level of Analysis 
Ohio House Bill 584 created minority set-aside programs in 
1980.40 This bill "stipulated that '5% of the aggregate value of all 
state construction contracts and 15% of the aggregate value of state 
procurement contracts each fiscal year had to be set aside for bid­
ding upon by minority business enterprises only."'41 The law also 
required that state construction contracts provided for about seven 
percent of the overall value of the contract to be awarded to minor­
ity subcontractors, service providers, and material men unless the 
Set Aside Review Board modified or changed the requirement.42 
Ohio's definition of "minority business enterprises" was business 
entities in which a minimum of fifty-one percent of the company 
was "owned and controlled" by Ohioans who were from "economi­
cally disadvantaged groups."43 This included Latinos, Asian Amer­
icans, African Americans, and Native Americans.44 In order to 
participate, the owner had to demonstrate ownership of the firm for 
at least one year before the participation application was filed.45 
B. The Impact of the Fullilove and Croson Cases 
Minority set-asides have increasingly come under attack over 
the past few years in the wake of bigger challenges to the basic 
principles of affirmative action.46 A number of court cases were 
launched on the basis of "reverse discrimination" claims. In Fulli­
love v. Klutznick,47 the Supreme Court clearly articulated its contin­
uing support of earlier legislation passed by the U.S. Congress, 
which stipulated that state and local governments that applied for 
grant awards under the category of the Public Works Act of 1977 
must demonstrate that at least ten percent of the grants would be 
used for contracts with minority enterprises.48 Thus, Fullilove con­
tinued the government's trend of using past discriminatory behavior 






46. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race Preferences Splits Michigan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al (discussing controversy over Michigan's ballot initia­
tive to limit affirmative action and set-aside programs). 
47. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (the majority's position was re­
ceded from in Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and considered overruled in Doe 
v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
48. Id. at 448; BOSTON, supra note 15. 
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as a basis for continuing to support minority set-asides as a remedy 
in the minority-owned business sector. As the Supreme Court up­
held the ten percent set-aside program, it focused on the rather 
broad power of Congress to redress the societal impacts of past dis­
criminatory behavior.49 
The famous City of Richmond v. Croson50 case, however, 
opened the door for the introduction of numerous lawsuits against 
minority set-aside and procurement programs all over the country. 
Much of the progress that had resulted from the implementation of 
Fullilove was negated by the Croson case. In particular, Croson 
attacked the minority set-aside program that had been established 
by Richmond, Virginia. Richmond's program required thirty per­
cent of contracts awarded by the city to be set aside for bids from 
minority contractors in response to a record of past discrimination 
in terms of the number of contracts that had been awarded to mi­
norities.51 White contractors challenged the basis for having such a 
program and were able to receive support from the Reagan admin­
istration,52 which favored the use of a strict scrutiny test. As 
Thomas Boston has noted, when discussing the Croson's majority 
decision: 
All classifications based on race, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
argued, whether benefiting or burdening minorities or non­
minorities will be subject to strict scrutiny .... 
. . . On this issue Justice Marshall dissented. He argued that 
this standard should be applied to those classifications that dis­
criminate against minorities but not those designed to eliminate 
past discrimination .... 
[Following Croscn, the] distinction between the powers of 
federal, state and local agencies to implement racial mandates 
was dissolved in the June 1995 Supreme Court decision in the 
case of Adarand Constructors v. Pena and the u.s. Department of 
Transportation. The Supreme Court ruled in a five-to-four vote 
that strict scrutiny must be the standard of review for race-based 
programs of the federal government as well. In making this 
shift, the Court voided all previous rulings that interpreted the 
49. BOSTON, supra note 15. 
50. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
51. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 34-35. 
52. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Croson, 
488 U.S. 469 (No. 87-998), available at 1988 WL 1025715 (Westlaw). 
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equal protection clause of the constitution as having a different 
application at different levels of government.53 
As a result of the Croson case and various other factors, mi­
nority set-aside programs were overturned in several American 
cities, including Cleveland, Columbus, Atlanta, Miami, and Phila­
delphia.54 Ballot initiatives were also passed in Washington and 
California, which eliminated several programs that provided assis­
tance to racial, ethnic, and gender groups.55 
Federal courts in Ohio have also been ambivalent towards 
their treatment of affirmative action and set-aside programs in the 
past few decades. In 1982, Judge Kinneary was responsible for 
striking down the Minority Business Enterprise Act of 1980 in re­
sponse to a case brought by a White contractor.56 The Sixth Circuit, 
however, reversed this decision one year later, arguing that minori­
ties had been affected by discriminatory behavior that existed in the 
procedure used in Ohio's purchasing and contract policies.57 
In 1996, Ohio governor, George Voinovich, established a "So­
cially and Economically Disadvantaged Business Policy."58 Eco­
nomic disadvantage focuses on analyzing the relative and personal 
wealth of the business owner. Social disadvantage, on the other 
hand, includes traditional minority groups, as well as individuals 
who are disadvantaged because of physical disability, color, gender, 
ethnicity, or because they live in an area with a high unemployment 
rate. 
State Magistrate Rita Bash Eaton ruled in October 1996 that 
Ohio should provide affirmative action awards using economic 
need as a criterion, rather than only race.59 She stressed that Ohio's 
Minority Business Enterprise program was unconstitutional when 
race-based criterion excluded individuals who had experienced eco­
53. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 36, 38. 
54. Mitchell F. Rice, State and Local Government Set-Aside Programs, Disparity 
Studies, and Minority Business Development in Post-Croson Era, 15 J. URB. AFF. 529, 
534 (1993). 
55. Id. 
56. Ohio Contractor's Ass'n v. Keip, No. C-2-82-446 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 1982) 
(striking down Ohio's Minority Business Enterprise Act of 1980, OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 123.151 (West 1980)), rev'd, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Associ­
ated Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabnik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000). 
57. Ohio Contractor's Ass'n, 713 F.2d at 173; see Joe Hallet, Ohio's Race-Based 
Contracts 'Unlawful': Need Should Count for More than Ethnicity, Says, Magistrate, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 31, 1996, at 1A. 
58. Rice, supra note 54, at 534. 
59. Hallet, supra note 57. 
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nomic hardship or disadvantage.6o The Ohio Supreme Court voted 
unanimously in April 1999 that a certain portion of Ohio's state set­
aside programs for minority contractors was constitutiona1.61 Cur­
rently, the set-asides for construction are considered invalid, while 
programs for goods and services are still allowed. The data indicate 
that minorities and women received between $15 and $18 million in 
contracts from Cuyahoga County in 1999 under the aegis of its 
Equal Economic Opportunity Program.62 
The Cuyahoga County Equal Economic Opportunity Program 
was finally repealed by the Cuyahoga County Commissioners in 
January of 2000.63 This program had been made possible by a 1993 
resolution that required contractors and suppliers to use minority 
subcontractors when making bids.64 One of the most noticeable ef­
fects of this repeal is that women and minorities are still eligible to 
bid for county contracts, but the previous requirement that major­
ity-owned firms were compelled to do business with minority­
owned firms is no longer in place. An interim program was put in 
place as several organizations in Ohio commissioned other corpora­
tions to perform disparity studies for particular industries.65 The 
data from these studies will be important in future discussions on 
minority set-aside programs.66 
60. Id. 
61. Ritchey Produce Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 707 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio 
1999). 
62. Albert C. Jones, Commissioners Shut Out Minority Bidders, Repeal 1993 




66. John Nolan, Appeals Court Rejects Ohio's Contract Program for Minorities, 
CALL & POST (Cleveland), June 8, 2000, at 6B. According to Mitchell Rice, disparity 
studies are also known as predicate studies or discrimination studies. One major pur­
pose of these studies is to provide information on the extent to which a previous locale 
has discriminated against minorities, with particular emphasis on business and eco­
nomic discrimination. Rice, supra note 54, at 536. In the case of Cleveland, a consor­
tium of various entities in the city, including the Cleveland Municipal School District, 
the Board of Cuyahoga County Commissioners, the Cuyahoga Community College 
District, the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, and the Cleveland­
Cuyahoga County Port Authority, have announced that they were uniting their efforts 
to have a disparity study performed by Mason Tillman Associates Ltd. and W.S. Wil­
liams Ph.D. Inc. See 4 MASON TILLMAN Assocs., MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DISPARITY 
STUDIES: CLEVELAND-CUYAHOGA COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY DISPARITY STUDY 
(2003). According to material advanced by the various organizations involved in the 
study, "[i]ndustries considered were construction, architecture and engineering, profes­
sional services, and goods and other services for fiscal years January 1, 1998, to Decem­
ber 31, 2000. Mason Tillman performed the disparity studies to assess whether requisite 
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A. Research Design and Methodology 
Research was performed by studying African American entre­
preneurs in Cleveland, Ohio, and its eastern suburbs from the 
spring of 1998 to the summer 2000. Ohio Board of Regents funded 
this study with a two-year grant of $64,000. Cleveland was selected 
for the location of the study because it is a large urban area with a 
sizable African American population. The study focused on small 
businesses, which can generally be defined as enterprises that are 
not dominant entities in their areas of concentration. Small busi­
nesses are also characterized as entities in which the owners usually 
invested relatively small amounts of capital at the onset of the busi­
ness, usually hired less than 500 employees to work in their firms, 
and although there was a considerable variation in the sample, usu­
ally earned less than $100,000 per year in profits. Four major types 
of businesses were included: manufacturing, construction, retail or 
trade, and services. Businesses that did not fit into these areas were 
placed in an "unclassified category," which included promotion 
(i.e., marketing), real estate, distribution, and finance. 
The main focus of the data-collection process centered on de­
veloping a database of African American entrepreneurs who re­
sided in the geographically-targeted areas identified above. This 
process proved to be a major challenge because no definitive list 
currently exists in northeast Ohio that includes the names, ad­
dresses, and phone numbers of all African American entrepre­
neurs. Hence, several different strategies were utilized. One 
strategy was to develop a list of the names of all of the Black-owned 
businesses, which were included in The Cleveland Black Pages that 
were located in our geographically specified area of focus. There 
were some challenges to using this strategy such as the fact that 
participation in this publication is voluntary, and therefore, some 
entrepreneurs were not included. 
A second strategy was to compile a list of the entrepreneurs 
that were included in the Certified Minority Business lists from the 
Ohio Department of Development and the City of Cleveland. 
These lists included names of businesses in which fifty-one percent 
or more of the company was owned by African Americans, Native 
factual conditions exist pursuant to Croson v. Richmond guidelines to justify MBEIFBE 
[minority business enterprise and female business enterprise] Programs." Id. at i. 
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American, Latinos, or Asian Americans. The major barrier to us­
ing this approach was that there was no scientific way to determine 
the ethnicities of the entrepreneurs. Hence, letters were sent out to 
all everyone included on the list, which included the owners of 544 
firms. Phone calls were made to the owners to encourage them to 
participate in the study as well as to explain the purpose of the 
study. Efforts were made to determine the probable universe of 
African American entrepreneurs on the broader "minority business 
list." Statistical census data was used to determine the probable 
number of African Americans residing in the target area. Because 
African Americans constitute about forty percent of the population 
in the geographical area of focus for this study, forty percent of the 
total number of owners on the minority business list was taken, 
which included about 217 owners. One hundred thirty-six entrepre­
neurs participated in this study, which was a response rate of sixty­
three percent. Of these, five owners were a part of the pretest, one 
entrepreneur's response was used for narrative purpose only, and 
statistical analysis was performed on the remaining 130 business 
owners. The study included data on both successful and unsuccess­
ful businesses. To test the hypotheses advanced in this study, an­
swers to specific questions on the survey were used relating to the 
independent and dependent variables identified in the hypotheses 
selected for analysis, which are discussed later in this Essay. 
B. 	 Hypotheses Selected for Analysis 
1. 	 Entrepreneurs Who Have Participated in, or Benefited 
from, Minority Set-Aside Programs Are More Successful 
than Their Nonparticipating Counterparts 
The hypothesis-that entrepreneurs participating in minority 
set-aside programs should experience greater levels of success than 
their nonparticipating counterparts-was based on previous studies 
performed by Timothy Bates and Thomas Boston. These studies 
argue that receipt of minority set-aside contracts led to business 
success for Black business owners.67 This hypothesis tested that 
proposition. To measure the independent variable, data was taken 
from the questionnaire regarding whether the entrepreneurs had 
participated in minority set-aside programs. The dependent varia­
ble was measured by using the number of years the business had 
been in operation and profits. In determining how success would 
67. 	 BOSTON, supra note 15, at 92; Bates, supra note 35, at 61. 
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be measured, previous works of other scholars in the field were uti­
lized. However, the number of years in operation was the main 
dependent variable because more independent variables in the 
larger study on Black-owned businesses were correlated to longev­
ity than to any of the other dependent variables. 
2. 	 Entrepreneurs Who Are in Certain Types of Industry 
Areas Would Participate More in Minority Set­
Aside Programs 
The rationale for the hypothesis, that entrepreneurs who are in 
specific types of industry areas would participate more in minority 
set-aside programs than those in other vocations, is that earlier 
studies performed by Timothy Bates indicated that owners of con­
struction companies were some of the major benefactors of minor­
ity set-aside programs.68 Here, this proposition is examined by 
looking at African American entrepreneurs in Cleveland, Ohio. 
The independent variables were the industry areas of service, con­
struction, retail or trade, and manufacturing. The dependent varia­
ble was whether owners participated in minority set-aside 
programs. 
3. 	 Owners Who Have Higher Levels of Education Should 
Participate More in Minority Set-Aside Programs 
The rationale for the hypothesis-that owners who have higher 
levels of education should participate more in minority set-aside 
programs-is that Timothy Bates's previous studies demonstrated 
that the entrepreneurs' education affected their ability to achieve 
economic success.69 Here, we examined the impact of education on 
an entrepreneur's ability to participate in, or benefit from minority 
set-aside programs. The independent variable was the level of edu­
cation of Black business owners who participated in minority set­
aside programs. 
4. 	 Older Business Owners Should Participate More in 
Minority Set-Aside Programs 
The rationale for the hypothesis, that older business owners 
should participate more in minority set-aside programs, is that 
Timothy Bates's earlier studies found that economic success was 
68. 	 BOSTON, supra note 15, at 29; Bates, supra note 35, at 58. 
69. 	 Bates, supra note 35, at 57. 
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positively correlated with the age of the business owners.7° Here, 
we looked at the impact of the age of the entrepreneur on partici­
pating in, or benefiting from minority set-aside programs. The in­
dependent variable was the age of Black business owners. The 
dependent variable was whether the owners participated in minor­
ity set-aside programs. 
C. Demographic Data on the Entrepreneurs 
In order to be eligible to participate in Ohio's set-aside pro­
grams, entrepreneurs had to be certified with the State of Ohio, the 
City of Cleveland, or other agencies that provided certification ser­
vices. Although 67% of the African American business owners in 
this study felt that the impact of the minority set-aside programs 
had been positive, only 31 % of them were actually certified. 
Hence, 69% of the entrepreneurs were ineligible to participate in 
these programs even though the data from this study demonstrates 
that participating in set-aside programs offered positive and mea­
surable benefits to the business owners. 
When cross tabulations were performed to compare the demo­
graphic characteristics of the Black entrepreneurs who participated 
in minority set-aside programs versus those who did not, the follow­
ing results emerged. Seventy-three percent of the participants in 
the set-aside programs had businesses that were located in the city 
of Cleveland, rather than its suburbs, and most (75%) of them were 
men, rather than women.71 About 77% of the participants were 
married and about 80% owned corporations.72 
Twenty-five percent of the participants were between the ages 
of 31 and 40; 27% were between 41 and 50; and 34% were between 
51 and 60, with very small percentages in other age categories. 
About 48% of the entrepreneurs who participated had earned un­
dergraduate degrees or higher, while another 32% had attended 
some university classes.73 Fifty-nine percent of the businesses 
earned less than $100,000 per year in profits, while 24% earned be­
tween $100,000 and $249,999. The largest number of participants 
owned service-related businesses. The number of years that partici­
pants' businesses had been in operation varied considerably, with 
21 % having been in business for 1-5 years; around 32% for 6-10 
70. /d. at 60 tbl.2. 
71. See infra tbls.1-2. 
72. See infra tbls.3-4. 
73. See infra tbl.6. 
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years; 14% for 11-20 years; 11.35% for 21-25 years; and 11.35% for 
26-30 years.74 
D. Testing the Hypotheses 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions and Logistical Re­
gressions were used to test the hypotheses advanced in this Essay. 
In performing the OLS Regressions for this Essay, the following 
methodology was followed. The author examined the predictive 
ability of the independent variable with the dependent variables to 
ascertain if multi-colinearity existed between the independent vari­
able on the dependent variables in Table 10.75 OLS Regressions 
analyze causation rather than correlation. Because the author indi­
cated which variables were independent and which were depen­
dent, the following results emerged: 
For the hypothesis set forth in Part II.B.l, the results of the 
OLS Regressions indicate a positive and significant relationship be­
tween participating in, or benefiting from, minority set-aside pro­
grams and economic success, when success is measured by years in 
operation and total profits per year. Therefore, this hypothesis was 
supported by the data.76 
The hypothesis detailed in Part II.B.2 postulated that entrepre­
neurs in certain industry areas participate more in minority set­
aside programs. This hypothesis was supported because the data 
from Table 11 indicate that there was a positive and significant rela­
tionship between having a construction business and participating 
in, or benefiting from, minority set-aside programs.77 
However, the hypothesis announced in Part II.B.3 was not sup­
ported by the data. This hypothesis posited that entrepreneurs with 
higher levels of education participate more in minority set-aside 
programs.78 Finally, the hypothesis discussed in Part II.BA argued 
that older entrepreneurs should participate more in minority set­
aside programs. This hypothesis was also not supported by the 
data.79 
74. See infra tbl.9. 
75. See infra tbl.10. 
76. See infra tbl.10. 
77. See infra tbl.1l. 
78. See infra tbl.1l. 
79. See infra tbl.1l. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the findings presented here demonstrate that af­
firmative action programs, and by extension minority set-aside pro­
grams, appear to have a positive and empirical impact on the 
success of Black business owners. The data from this study indicate 
that the relationship between participation in minority set-aside 
programs and economic success is positive and significant, regard­
less of how success is measured. In other words, when other vari­
ables in the study are controlled, entrepreneurs who received 
minority set-asides were more successful than those who did not. 
Two measures of success were used: the number of years the busi­
nesses had been in operation and the total profits per year. The 
results of this research project thus validate the importance of keep­
ing these types of programs in place. However, the results 
presented here should also be examined in the context of other is­
sues that emerged from this study. For example, a larger number of 
African American entrepreneurs need to understand the impor­
tance of becoming certified minority and female business owners 
and need to complete the certification process. The data indicate 
that only a small minority of Black-owned businesses in Cleveland 
are certified even though the data from the study overwhelming 
demonstrate that entrepreneurs who did participate in these pro­
grams are more successful than those who do not. 
34 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:19 
TABLE 1. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF BLACK RESPONDENTS 

WHO HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, 

MINORITY SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS 

Geographic Location Percentage 
Shaker Heights 7.0 
Cleveland 73.0 
Maple Heights 2.0 
Cleveland Heights 5.0 




South Euclid 5.0 
TABLE 2. GENDER OF BLACK RESPONDENT WHO HAVE BEEN A 








TABLE 3. MARITAL STATUS OF BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO 
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TABLE 4. CLASSIFICATION OF BLACK-OWNED BUSINESSES WHO 
HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, 

MINORITY SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS 

Classification Percentage 
Sole Proprietorship 20.5 
Partnership -
Corporation 79.5 
TABLE 5. AGE OF BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN A 






20-30 Years 4.6 
31-40 Years 25.0 
41-50 Years 27.1 
51-60 Years 34.1 
61-70 Years 4.6 
71-80 Years 2.3 
Over 80 Years 2.3 
TABLE 6. LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF BLACK RESPONDENTS 






Less than High School 2.3 
High School 9.1 
Some College or University 31.8 
Associate or Vocational Degree 9.1 
College Degree 34.1 
Post Graduate Degree 13.6 
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TABLE 7. TOTAL PROFITS IN DOLLAR TERMS PER YEAR OF 
BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR 

BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS 

Profits Percentage 









TABLE 8. TYPE OF BLACK-OWNED BUSINESSES WHO HAVE 





Type of Businesses Number of Businesses 
Construction 11 
Man ufacturing 2 
Services 25 
Retail 5 
Other Businesses 5 
TABLE 9. YEARS IN OPERATION FOR BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO 





Years in Operation Percentage 
Less than 1 Year 2.3 
1-5 Years 20.5 
6-10 Years 31.8 
11-20 Years 13.6 
21-25 Years 11.35 
26-30 Years 11.35 
More than 30 Years 9.1 
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TABLE 10. OLS REGRESSIONS 
Variable (Independent Years in Operation Total Profits Per Year 
Variables) (Dependent Variable) (Dependent Variable) 
Whether They Had Been 0.606** 0.473* 
Part of, or Benefited from, (0.235) (0.248) 
a Minority Set-Aside 
Program 
Age of the Business Owner 0.612*** 0.131 
(0.104) (0.109) 
Gender of the Business 0.168 0.255 
Owner (0.249) (0.267) 
Highest Level of Education 0.221 ** 0.106 
Attained (0.075) (0.079) 
Constant (a) 0.358 1.017* 
(0.461) (0.487) 
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.045 
Standard Error 1.2912 1.3099 
F 14.520*** 2.387* 
N 127.0 117.0 
Sources: Original telephone interview schedule, spring 1998 through summer 2000. 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.SO 
*P<0.05 **P<O.01 ***P<O.OOI 
·Years in operation is the main dependent variable model. 
***Although 136 entrepreneurs participated in the study, the size of the Ns in Table 1 vary 
for each dependent variable based on how many of the entrepreneurs answered the 
question on the questionnaire regarding the number of years their business had been in 
operation and the amount of their business profits in U.S. dollars per year. 
80. In this Essay, the author reports nonstandardized regression coefficients 
rather than standardized values. Here, she adopts the methodological approach 
advocated in Gary King, How Not to Lie with Statistics: Avoiding Common Mistakes in 
Quantitative Political Science, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 672 (1985). King argues that 
standardized coefficients are harder to interpret and do not necessarily provide 
information that could help to compare the effects from different explanatory variables. 
Moreover, standardized coefficients may provide unreliable or misleading information. 
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TABLE 11. LOGISTICAL REGRESSIONS 
Independent Variables 
Gender of Business Owner 
Age of the Business Owner 
Level of Education Attained by the 
Owner 










Dependent Variable (Whether They Had 

Been a Part of, or Benefited from, 























Sources: Original telephone interview schedule, spring 1998 through summer 2000. 

Note: Entries are nonstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. 

*P<0.05 **P<O.01 ***P<0.001 

